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Abstract 
This paper forms an appreciation of and a critical reflection on Sarasvathy’s work on 
causation and effectuation models of entrepreneurship. While Sarasvathy has made 
significant contributions to the field, it is suggested that a more fruitful approach can follow if 
two modifications are made. First, it is argued that the six dimensions on which the two 
models differ are independent and therefore that it is more fruitful to focus on the dimensions 
rather than on the two models. Second, it is argued that a pragmatist view on 
entrepreneurship is most fruitful when it is not applied at the level of the entrepreneurial 
process but at the level of the underlying human actions.  
 
 
Introduction 
Entrepreneurship scholars have made significant efforts to explain how and why new firms 
originate, survive, and grow (Davidsson, 2004; Gartner, 1985; Schumpeter, 1934). These 
efforts have converged into a teleological model of entrepreneurship as a rationally planned, 
risk-taking and linear process of opportunity recognition and exploitation (e.g., Bhave, 1994; 
Bird, 1988; Jenkins & Johnson, 1997; Shane & Venkataraman, 2000). This model has now 
become the mainstream model of the entrepreneurship process. Recently, however, some 
scholars have started to question the validity of this model. As an alternative, these scholars 
have developed a model of entrepreneurship as a means-driven, risk-aversive, and circular 
process involving ‘bricolage’ and ‘effectuation’ (e.g., Baker & Nelson, 2005; Sarasvathy, 
2001a; Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005). This alternative model could be described as the 
pragmatist model of entrepreneurship (cf. James, 1907; Peirce, 1931; Rescher, 2005).  
 
The merit of the pragmatist model is that it provides a counterbalance against an overly 
rational view on entrepreneurship. As such, it addresses some of the limitations of the 
teleological model. At the same time however, it has appeared that also the pragmatist model 
does not provide a sufficient explanation of the entrepreneurship process and its relation to 
firm survival and growth. This has led scholars from both sides to believe that, to arrive at a 
better explanation, both models are needed or that the two models should be combined 
(Groen, Wakkee, & De Weerd-Nederhof, 2008; Sarasvathy, 2006b). Currently, 
entrepreneurship scholars are puzzled by the questions of what are the similarities and 
differences between the two models relate, how do they relate, and whether and how 
combinations can or should be made. Illustrative for the liveliness of the topic are the 
discussions held at the professional development workshop (PDW) on effectuation at the 
2007 meeting of the Academy of Management (Sarasvathy et al., 2007c) and the initiation of 
a PDW on opportunity creation and discovery in 2008 (Alvarez et al., 2008). 
 
The point that there are two opposing models of the entrepreneurial process has been most 
explicitly made by Sarasvathy. She even called her pragmatist model of effectuation the 
inverse of the teleological model, which she labeled the causation model (Sarasvathy, 2001b). 
Below we shall argue that Sarasvathy’s point carries weight but that it needs to be refined and 
extended. We shall put forward that it is more useful to focus on the dimensions on which the 
two models different than on the models themselves because they are merely two extremes 
within a much broader spectrum of entrepreneurial behavior. Moreover, we shall argue that 
neither of the two models should be exclusively connected to pragmatism and that a more 
explicit distinction should be made between the entrepreneurial process and human action in 
general.  
 
 3 
We shall proceed this paper by reviewing and building further on Sarasvathy’s work on 
effectuation and causation. Our analysis will we based on Sarasvathy’s published work in 
conference proceedings and journals and her recent book (Dew & Sarasvathy, 2002, 2003; 
Sarasvathy, 2001a, 2001b, 2003, 2008; Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005, 2007; Sarasvathy, Dew, 
Read, & Wiltbank, 2007b; Sarasvathy & Kotha, 2001; Venkataraman & Sarasvathy, 2001) as 
well as unpublished manuscripts made available on her website (Sarasvathy, 2006a, 2006c; 
Sarasvathy, Dew, Read, & Wiltbank, 2007a; www.effectuation.org).  
 
Comparison of the Two Models 
In several of her publications, Sarasvathy systematically compares the causation and the 
effectuation model. Six dimensions appear repeatedly in these comparisons, mostly in the 
form of dichotomies: means-driven vs. ends-driven, control vs. prediction, affordable loss vs. 
expected returns, new vs. existing products and markets, cooperation vs. competition, and 
cyclicality vs. linearity (see Table 1). Below we summarize Sarasvathy’s arguments and 
assess them.    
 
Table 1. Comparison of the causation and effectuation model 
 
Dimension Causation model (teleological) Effectuation model (pragmatist) 
Starting point Ends are given Means are given 
Assumptions on future Predictability means controllability Controllability reduces need to predict 
Predisposition towards risk Expected return Affordable loss 
Appropriate for Existing products and markets New products and markets 
Attitude toward outside firms Competition Cooperation 
Type of model Linear Cyclical 
 
Means-driven vs. ends-driven  
The key distinction that Sarasvathy stresses in all her publications on effectuation is the 
different starting point of the two models. She argues that the causation model starts with 
goals as a given and that the basic decision for that model is the decision on what means 
should be accumulated to achieve these goals. Effectuation, on the other hand, starts with 
means and focuses on the decision on what effect can be created given these means. The idea 
that effectuation starts with means and takes them as a given does not imply that it is merely a 
variation of the resource based view (e.g., Barney, 1991). On the contrary, by its focus on 
subjectivity and imagination, effectuation explains a great deal of what are means and how 
they are created (Dew & Sarasvathy, 2002). Effectuation involves seeing means and 
resources where others do not see them or only see worthless things that cannot be used to 
create value. It starts by asking the questions of who I am, what I know and whom I know, 
rather than by a particular goal or opportunity (Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005).   
Sarasvathy’s focus on means-driven entrepreneurial processes is an elemental 
extension of entrepreneurial thinking that serves as a counterbalance against the dominant 
teleological model. It allows for opportunistic and creative explanations of entrepreneurship 
that fall beyond the scope of the teleological model. Hence, this first dimension is a strong 
point of her model. However, as we shall argue below, her effectuation model requires 
further attention where Sarasvathy starts to directly connect this dimension to other 
dimensions of the entrepreneurial process.   
 
Control vs. prediction 
A second dimension – or actually two dimensions – on which the effectuation and the 
causation model differ, concerns the assumed predictability and controllability of the future. 
The causation model focuses on the predictable aspects of an uncertain future and follows a 
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logic of “to the extent we can predict future, we can control it” (Sarasvathy, 2001a: 251). 
Effectuation, on the other hand, focuses on the controllable aspects of an unpredictable future 
and follows a logic of “to the extent we can control future, we do not need to predict it” 
(ibid.). Hence, while causation primarily focuses on those aspects of the future that are 
predictable, effectuation primarily focuses on the aspects that are controllable.  
 As the above quotes illustrate, Sarasvathy considers controllability and predictability 
to be related. In the causation model, a higher predictability implies a higher controllability 
and in the effectuation model a higher controllability implies a reduced need for 
predictability. At other places, however, Sarasvathy suggests that predictability and 
controllability are two different characteristics of a firm’s environment. Sarasvathy explicitly 
recognizes this when she locates effectuation in a 2x2 matrix spanning up four ideal type 
entrepreneurial strategies (www.effectuation.org/faq.htm). From that matrix we can invoke 
that effectuation will be most effective in situations with high controllability and low 
predictability. We can also invoke that there are three other strategies and not one, implying 
that the exclusive focus on effectuation and causation models is probably too limited. The 
other three strategies are labeled adaptive strategies (low predictability, low controllability), 
risk-aversion strategies (high predictability, low controllability) and scientific strategies (high 
predictability, high controllability). It is not clear which of these three relates to the causation 
model. Hence, we must conclude that, on these dimensions, causation and effectuation are 
not two mutually exclusive models and that there are more entrepreneurial strategies than 
only these two.  
 Through her focus on the two models, Sarasvathy claims that a means-driven 
entrepreneurial process goes automatically together with a focus on controllability. However, 
while the means-driven vs. ends-driven dimension can be related to controllability and 
predictability, it is not necessarily so. Means-driven entrepreneurship can just as well go 
together with a focus on predictability. Suppose, for example, somebody is extremely good in 
motivating and instructing other people and starts thinking what to do with this capability. 
This is a means-driven approach. Yet, the person can still adopt a strategy in which he or she 
chooses to focus on predictability. An example would be to become a teacher or a business 
coach in a stable and relatively predictable industry. Hence, we must conclude that a 
combination of means-driven behavior and a focus on controllability is only one out of 
multiple possible combinations.   
 
Affordable loss vs. expected returns 
A third dimension that Sarasvathy puts forward to distinguish the effectuation model from the 
causation model concerns the assumed predisposition toward risk in both models. She argues 
that causation focuses on maximizing returns by selecting optimal strategies while 
effectuation begins with a determination of how much one is willing to lose. “The causal 
entrepreneur calculates up front how much money he needs to start the venture and invests 
time, effort and energy in raising that money. The effectuator, in contrast, tries to estimate the 
down side and examines what she is willing to lose in order to start the venture.” (Sarasvathy, 
2006a: 1).  
Also here we must conclude that this dimension is not necessarily related to the 
previous dimensions. A focus on affordable loss can go together with a focus on means and 
controllability. However, it not necessarily has to go together with them. If I start my 
enterprise from the question of how to maximize returns from my own capabilities and 
resources, I follow a means-driven strategy focusing on expected returns. Or, if I have a clear 
goal in mind where to go with my business, irrespective of whether I currently have the 
means to realize that, I can still follow a risk-aversive strategy in which I try to minimize my 
risks and potential losses.  
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 Unlike Sarasvathy suggests, risk-aversiveness is also not directly related to the 
perceived predictability and controllability of the environment. I can perceive my 
environment as very predictable but still follow a strategy that focuses on minimizing losses. 
Similarly, if I focus on the controllability of my environment, I can still strive to maximize 
my expected returns. Hence, we must conclude that the three dimensions of means vs. ends-
driven, control vs. prediction, and affordable loss vs. expected returns are not related in the 
unequivocal way suggested by Sarasvathy.  
 
New products and markets vs. existing products and markets 
A fourth distinction between the two models centers around a firm’s focus on new or existing 
products and markets. Sarasvathy argues that the causation model focuses on acquiring a 
market share in existent markets whereas effectuation focuses on the creation of new markets 
(Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005). In terms of product-market combinations, causation is assumed to 
concentrate in existing products and markets while effectuation concentrates on new products 
and markets, also called the ‘suicide quadrant’ (Sarasvathy, 2003).  Two remarks can be 
made about this.  
 First, it is not clear why the effectuation model would only apply in, or be best 
suitable for, the creation of new markets. Firms working smarter and more efficient within an 
existing market can just as well benefit from effectual thinking and behavior. When applied 
in such situations, effectuation would focus on how the current business can be improved or 
optimized by using and exploiting the existing means and contacts without creating any new 
product or market. Hence, effectuation also works for existing products and existing markets. 
 Second, effectuation typically only works for evolutionary development, while for 
radical disruptive innovations the causation model is more appropriate. Since the effectuation 
model starts from what is already there and gradually develops this into something new, it 
hinders the development of revolutionary changes. For such changes, vision, long term goals, 
anticipation of customer needs, and thinking beyond what is currently possible are important 
(Walsh, 2004). Hence, both the effectuation and the causation models can be suitable for the 
development and creation of new products and markets.  
  
Cooperation vs. competition 
The fifth dimension on which Sarasvathy characterizes the two models is the attitude toward 
outside firms. She distinguishes between cooperation and competition. She argues that, for 
the effectuation model, the focus is on establishing cooperative partnerships in order to build 
a market together with customers, suppliers, and even prospective competitors. Docility – 
people’s ability to persuade and be persuaded – plays an important role in this. (Dew & 
Sarasvathy, 2003). In the causation model, firms are supposed to focus on competition and to 
constrain task relationships with customers and suppliers to just what is necessary. Two 
comments can be made about this.  
 First, the associations of effectuation with cooperation and causation with competition 
are not necessary and oversimplify both cooperation and competition in business 
relationships. By arguing that the causation model is associated with a minimizing of 
cooperative relationships and referring to the work of Porter (1980), Sarasvathy seems to put 
away the broad literature on alliances, interorganizational relationships, joint ventures and 
networks. While that literature focuses on end-driven behavior, it makes clear that firms 
make use of cooperative partnerships all the time (e.g., Dyer & Singh, 1998; Ring & Van de 
Ven, 1994). Hence, we can conclude that partnerships are elemental for both the effectuation 
and the causation model.  
 Secondly, Sarasvathy hardly pays attention to the disadvantages of cooperation and 
the impact of time. She focuses on the creation of markets, for which cooperation is assumed 
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to be necessary. At the same time, however, cooperation also means that returns and profits 
will have to be shared with others. This can mean a lower market share than otherwise could 
be the case or lower profits. For an entrepreneur, it can be beneficial in the early stages of 
development to cooperate with a venture capitalist, for example. However, this same 
cooperation also limits the returns that flow to the entrepreneur at a later stage. Also, if 
intellectual property plays an important role a too early cooperation with other firms can be 
detrimental for the firm when it has not sufficiently protected its own intellectual 
contributions.   
 
Cyclical vs. linear   
A final distinction that Sarasvathy sees between the two models is that the causation model is 
primarily linear and the effectuation model inherently cyclical. As she argues, causation is 
applicable in static, linear, and independent environment whereas effectuation is better 
applicable in environments that are dynamic, nonlinear, and ecological. We see no need why 
this should be the case and believe this too is an oversimplification of the teleological model. 
The mere fact that teleological behavior is mainly driven by goals does not imply that it is so 
in a simple linear way. Goals are adjusted based on the situations that are faced and the 
means that have become available. If we consider the entrepreneurial process of opportunity 
recognition, development and exploitation, there is an implicit and sometimes even explicit 
assumption that the process is iterative rather than linear (Bhave, 1994; Van der Veen & 
Wakkee, 2004). Along the same line, the fact that behavior is means-driven does not imply 
that it is cyclical. Hence, cyclicality cannot be a characteristic exclusively attributed to the 
effectuation model.  
 
Intermediate conclusion 
From the above evaluation of Sarasvathy’s elaborations on the two models we can conclude 
that Sarasvathy has made substantial simplifications in automatically connecting the six 
dimensions to one another. We hope to have demonstrated that the six dimensions are to a 
large extent independent and that the effectuation model and causation model as described by 
Sarasvathy are only two extreme models. They are ideal types composed of the six 
dimensions but in no way is the practice of entrepreneurship limited to these two models.  
 
Beyond the Dichotomy: Causation, Effectuation, Teleology and Pragmatism 
So far, we have focused on Sarasvathy’s work on causation and effectuation without much 
reference to teleology and pragmatism. While the notion of pragmatism does only play a 
peripheral role in Sarasvathy’s papers, she repeatedly mentions the classical works of James, 
Peirce, Dewey, and more recently Joas (1997) as interesting developments in the broader 
social sciences (Dew & Sarasvathy, 2002: 12; , 2003: 25; Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005: 553-554; 
Venkataraman & Sarasvathy, 2001: 11-13). Moreover, she suggests that the effectuation 
model is a pragmatist model that stands in stark contrast to the teleological causation model.  
 While Sarasvathy thus clearly favors ideas developed in the pragmatist tradition, her 
work stands in an equivocal relation to that tradition. She refers to it and suggests that her 
own thinking is very close to pragmatism, but she does not really incorporate work on 
pragmatism nor does she explicitly contribute to it. As we shall argue below, her treaty on 
effectuation and causation could have been more accurate and productive if she would have 
done so. In a more general sense, her work is largely based on psychological and economic 
theories whereas important developments on the nature of human action in the field of 
sociology have been largely ignored. The disregard of the sociological roots of 
entrepreneurship is a serious omission since teleological and pragmatist approaches are in the 
center of the sociological debate for decades (e.g., Alexander, 1983; Giddens, 1984; Joas, 
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1997; Luhmann, 1995; Parsons, 1951). By ignoring these developments, Sarasvathy and 
entrepreneurship scholars in general have overlooked an important opportunity to bring the 
field’s understanding of the entrepreneurship process a significant step further – Dunham & 
Venkataraman (2002) being an exception. Below we shall elaborate on the distinctions 
between the teleological and pragmatist views on human action as they are put forward in 
sociology and argue about implications for a model of the entrepreneurial process.  
 
On pragmatism  
Since Talcott Parsons’ attempt to develop a theory of action in the 1930s, many sociologists 
have engaged in the debate on the teleological and pragmatist character of human action (e.g., 
Alexander, 1983; Giddens, 1984; Joas, 1997; Luhmann, 1995; Parsons, 1951). To explicate 
the differences between the two, we will draw specifically from Parsons’ functionalist theory 
of action (Parsons, 1937, 1951) and Joas’ theory of creative action (Joas, 1997). These two 
theories, respectively, provide exemplar teleological and pragmatic models of human action. 
Moreover, Joas particularly positioned his theory against that of Parsons. As such, the two 
theories are a good starting point for understanding the differences and similarities between 
the two entrepreneurship models. As Joas argues, there are three defining characteristics of 
the pragmatist model that distinguish it from the teleological model: situatedness, 
corporeality, and sociality. These three characteristics are similar to what Nonaka & Takeuchi 
(1995) have referred to as the Japanese tradition of oneness of humanity and nature, body and 
mind, and self and other. For explaining these characteristics we unashamedly adopt Dunham 
& Venkataraman’s (2002) efficient summary:  
 
“According to Joas, our perceptions and hence our actions, are shaped by three major influences – our 
particular situation, our “corporeality” or connection to our bodies, and our sociality. The first of these 
is the most straightforward -- our particular situation shapes our action. We must continually revise our 
actions to conform to the experience that uniquely arises in each situation. And thus, “it is not sufficient 
to consider human actions as being contingent on the situation, but that it should also be recognized 
that the situation is constitutive of action” (1996: 160). Our very particular circumstances thus shape 
our perceptions and understandings of the world, and the actions we take in response to the 
circumstances. Thus the situation becomes the replacement for the means-ends schemas that 
characterize rational action theories. Rather than viewing each situation through the lens of pre-
established means-ends frameworks, it is the reverse that is true. It is the situation that continually 
generates and revises our learning, perceptions, goals, and actions. 
The notion of corporeality is more complex. According to Joas, our perceptions are rooted in 
our bodies – it is through our sensory, locomotive and communicative powers that we experience the 
world and control our actions in it. “Given that the fundamental forms of our capacity for action lie in 
the intentional movement of our body in connection with locomotion, object-manipulation and 
communication, our world is initially structured according to these dimensions” (1996: 158). Our 
bodies also play an important role in shaping our conscious plans of action, for within our bodies 
resides the pre-intentional feelings, emotions, inchoate aspirations that ultimately shape our intentions.  
Although our situations and our bodies’ connection with those situations are unique, the 
meaning we ultimately draw from our perceptions is socially based, rooted in language and shared 
experiences. We are inherently social creatures, dependent upon one another to make sense of the 
world. Furthermore, even our individual identity, and ultimate ability to achieve personal autonomy, is 
rooted in the social relationships that enable one to develop an evaluative sense of oneself. Hence, our 
interactions with others and the values, beliefs, and norms which guide those interactions play a critical 
role in the emergence of creative action.” (Dunham & Venkataraman, 2002: 16-17) 
 
Joas’ view on human action comprised by these three characteristics can be summarized as 
follows. First, humans always perceive the world in terms of the possible actions they can 
take. Hence, they perceive the world as a set of alternative opportunities that allow them to do 
certain things and constrain them in doing other things. Second, in perceiving these 
opportunities, humans are facilitated and constrained by their own body – their own 
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capabilities, skills, and existing knowledge. Humans have a perception of their own abilities 
and take this into consideration when judging the opportunities they face. Finally, being 
social creatures, humans are facilitated and constrained by others. Humans mutually 
influence and persuade one another to take particular actions and to refrain from taking other 
actions.  
 
Creative human action and the entrepreneurial process 
In theorizing about the implications of a pragmatist view for the entrepreneurial process, both 
Sarasvathy and Dunham & Venkataraman focus on developing an alternative model for the 
dominant teleological model. Both consider that pragmatist entrepreneurship is radically 
different from teleological entrepreneurship and that these are alternative modes applicable in 
different situations. While such view on the role of pragmatism in entrepreneurship has been 
useful to go beyond the teleological model, it fails to appreciate the most important point that 
Joas makes: that all creative human action is characterized by situatedness, corporeality, and 
sociality. This means that, irrespective of whether an entrepreneurial process is means-driven 
or ends-driven, is based on predictability or controllability, focuses on expected return or 
affordable loss, aims at existing or new products and markets, is based on competition or 
cooperation, or is linear or cyclical, the human action involved is always situated, corporeal, 
and social.  
The issue here is that Sarasvathy and Dunham & Venkataraman have applied 
pragmatist logic at the level of the entire entrepreneurial process while it is better applied at 
the level of individual human actions. Dew & Sarasvathy show some awareness of this in 
their remark “…entrepreneurial effectuation is but a special case of a more general theory of 
effectuation that might potentially be developed” (Dew & Sarasvathy, 2002: 22). Rather than 
taking entrepreneurial effectuation as the basis for a more general theory of effectuation, 
however, we believe it to be far more fruitful to turn their argument around. Building upon a 
long tradition of sociological theorizing and research on the nature of human action, Joas’ 
theory is more developed than the model of effectuation. Therefore, it seems more 
appropriate to take Joas’ theorizing as a pragmatist basis for conceptualizing the 
entrepreneurial process. Combined with the above observation that it is more fruitful to focus 
on the six dimensions rather than on the two models of entrepreneurship, we come to the 
following characterizations of entrepreneurial behavior (see Figure 1).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Human action and entrepreneurial behavior 
 
 
Dimensions of 
entrepreneurial behavior 
Underlying characteristics 
of human action 
Means-driven Ends-driven 
Focus on predictability 
Expected return 
Aimed at existing products/markets 
 Competition 
Linearity  
Focus on controllability 
Affordable loss 
Aimed at new products/markets 
Cooperation 
Cyclicality 
Situatedness    Corporeality    Sociality 
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Conclusion and discussion 
In this paper we have taken stock of Sarasvathy’s work on effectuation and have made two 
comments on it. First, we have argued that the six dimensions that Sarasvathy distinguishes 
are independent of one another and therefore, that the distinction between a causation model 
and an effectuation model is an oversimplication. Second, we have argued that pragmatism 
should better not be used to distinguish between two alternative models of entrepreneurship 
but to understand the nature of the underlying human action.  
 
By making these two comments, the paper intends to make two contributions. First, we 
intend to contribute to the current discussion on entrepreneurship. Most particularly the paper 
suggests that we should move from a discussion on alternative models to a discussion on the 
dimensions that comprise these models. Second, the paper suggests that a more explicit 
distinction and connection between the nature of the entrepreneurship process and the nature 
of human action should be made.  
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